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Abstract
Courts have long recognized the role of the securities industry’s accountants, lawyers, se-
curities analysts, and credit-rating agencies as “gatekeepers”—reputational intermediaries who,
for a fee, effectively rent their reputations for honesty, accuracy, and integrity to their corporate
clients in order to provide confidence to the clients’ investors. Under this reputational model, a
gatekeeper’s reputation is its chief capital asset. While it seems that gatekeepers would need very
little incentive to avoid risking this asset by helping their clients commit securities fraud, debacles
such as Enron, WorldCom, Refco, and the 2008 Financial Crisis demonstrate that this is not true.
Notable commentators suggest that if gatekeepers face a low risk of litigation, then the expected
value derived from risking their reputations by committing fraud increases. Yet ever since the
Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, even
when gatekeepers knowingly assist their clients to commit securities fraud, the clients’ investors
cannot bring aiding and abetting claims against these gatekeepers in Rule 10b-5 actions. Unsur-
prisingly, the period after Central Bank is marked by an increase in risky accounting practices and
less conservative reporting strategies. Furthermore, in both Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta (2008) and Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders (2011),
the Supreme Court further limited theories by which gatekeepers could be held liable as primary
violators under Rule 10b-5. Congress had several chances after Central Bank to restore the aiding
and abetting private right of action under 10b-5 but declined to do so. As a result, gatekeepers
who aid and abet fraud face a substantially reduced risk of litigation and therefore a substantially
reduced risk to their reputational capital. To effectively curtail securities fraud committed by gate-
keepers, private aiding and abetting liability must be reinstated. This Note will examine the history
of gatekeeper liability under the securities laws, particularly the rise and fall of the private right
of action for aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5. It will then explore theories from
several notable commentators of why gatekeepers would rationally risk their reputational capital
by knowingly acquiescing to their clients’ securities frauds. In concluding that the current state
of securities law does not provide the market with enough incentive to demand that gatekeepers
invest in and maintain their reputations, this Note argues that Congress must restore the right of
private plaintiffs to bring aiding and abetting claims under 10b-5.
∗J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2015; Member of the Chartered Alternative
Investment Analyst (CAIA) Association. This Note would not have been possible without the
invaluable advice and guidance from my note advisor, Prof. Caroline Gentile. I would also like to
thank my family and friends for their support and the editorial staff and members of the Fordham
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law for their efforts.
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ABSTRACT 
Courts have long recognized the role of the securities industry’s 
accountants, lawyers, securities analysts, and credit-rating agencies 
as “gatekeepers”—reputational intermediaries who, for a fee, 
effectively rent their reputations for honesty, accuracy, and integrity 
to their corporate clients in order to provide confidence to the 
clients’ investors. Under this reputational model, a gatekeeper’s 
reputation is its chief capital asset. While it seems that gatekeepers 
would need very little incentive to avoid risking this asset by helping 
their clients commit securities fraud, debacles such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Refco, and the 2008 Financial Crisis demonstrate that 
this is not true. Notable commentators suggest that if gatekeepers 
face a low risk of litigation, then the expected value derived from 
risking their reputations by committing fraud increases. Yet ever 
since the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in Central Bank of Denver 
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, even when gatekeepers 
knowingly assist their clients to commit securities fraud, the clients’ 
investors cannot bring aiding and abetting claims against these 
gatekeepers in Rule 10b-5 actions. Unsurprisingly, the period after 
Central Bank is marked by an increase in risky accounting practices 
and less conservative reporting strategies. Furthermore, in both 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta (2008) 
and Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders (2011), the 
Supreme Court further limited theories by which gatekeepers could 
be held liable as primary violators under Rule 10b-5. Congress had 
several chances after Central Bank to restore the aiding and abetting 
private right of action under 10b-5 but declined to do so. As a result, 
gatekeepers who aid and abet fraud face a substantially reduced risk 
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of litigation and therefore a substantially reduced risk to their 
reputational capital. 
To effectively curtail securities fraud committed by gatekeepers, 
private aiding and abetting liability must be reinstated. This Note 
will examine the history of gatekeeper liability under the securities 
laws, particularly the rise and fall of the private right of action for 
aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5. It will then explore 
theories from several notable commentators of why gatekeepers 
would rationally risk their reputational capital by knowingly 
acquiescing to their clients’ securities frauds. In concluding that the 
current state of securities law does not provide the market with 
enough incentive to demand that gatekeepers invest in and maintain 
their reputations, this Note argues that Congress must restore the 
right of private plaintiffs to bring aiding and abetting claims under 
10b-5. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is perhaps dismaying that participants in a fraudulent scheme who 
may even have committed criminal acts are not answerable in 
damages to the victims of [their] fraud . . . . However, . . . the fact 
that the plaintiff-investors have no claim is the result of a policy 
choice by Congress . . . . This choice may be ripe for legislative re 
examination.1 
This quotation from Judge Gerald Lynch of the Southern District of 
New York neatly sums up the state of securities law today and its 
treatment of aiding and abetting liability for the securities industry’s 
gatekeepers—accountants, lawyers, securities analysts, and credit-rating 
agencies.2 Judge Lynch made these remarks in In re Refco, Inc. 
Securities Litigation in which a lawyer, Joseph Collins, a partner at the 
law firm of Mayer Brown LLP, was alleged to have knowingly helped 
his client, Refco, fraudulently conceal its massive debts from its 
shareholders through an elaborate financial scheme.3 While Mr. Collins 
was later found to be criminally liable for his actions,4 the law does not 
                                                                                                                 
 1. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 319 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
aff’d sub nom. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 2. JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 103 (2006). 
 3. In re Refco, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 306-09. 
 4. Bob Van Voris, Ex-Refco Lawyer Guilty of Aiding $2.4 Billion Fraud, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2012), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/ 
2012-11-16/ex-refco-lawyer-guilty-of-aiding-2-4-billion-fraud.html. 
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currently allow any private plaintiff to collect damages from him, Mayer 
Brown, or any other gatekeeper who aids and abets fraud.5 
When financial market participants learn about gatekeeper-aided 
fraud, the effect on stock prices can be devastating.6 Investors, who rely 
on the work product of gatekeepers to evaluate the market, lose faith in 
the market and shift stock prices downward because they no longer trust 
that work product.7 This penalty is usually very severe.8 One study 
shows that public companies that announce financial statement 
restatements due to revenue recognition issues (an indicator of fraud) 
lose on average over 25% of their market value.9 Many such companies 
become insolvent, a fact which many commentators claim justifies 
private liability for gatekeepers.10 
Courts have long recognized the important role of gatekeepers in 
the financial markets as “reputational intermediaries.”11 In essence, 
gatekeepers use their reputations for accurate reporting, thorough due 
diligence, and trustworthiness to assure investors that their capital will 
be used wisely by the companies in which they invest and that it will 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See In re Refco, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 318-19. 
 6. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 55. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 83 (“When a restatement calls management’s credibility into question 
. . . the market reaction is . . . severe.”). 
 9. See Richardson et al., Predicting Earnings Management: The Case of Earnings 
Restatements, at 16 (Oct. 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=338681 
(measured over a time period of 120 days before the announcement of the restatement 
to 120 days after the announcement). 
 10. See Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1608-09 
(2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 156 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“Where statements are publicly attributed to a well-known national law 
or accounting firm, buyers and sellers of securities (and the market generally) are more 
likely to credit the accuracy of those statements.”); see also, e.g., United States v. 
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) (“By certifying the public reports 
that collectively depict a corporation’s financial status, the independent auditor assumes 
a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client. The 
independent public accountant performing this special function owes ultimate 
allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to investing 
public.”); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (“An 
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its 
reputation for careful work.”). 
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have the true potential to produce a good return on investment.12 In 
effect, gatekeepers “rent” their reputations to issuers.13 This enables an 
issuer to raise more capital at a lower expense than it otherwise would 
have incurred had it been necessary to build a reputation on its own (this 
is especially true if the issuer is smaller or more unknown). At the same 
time, gatekeepers serve investors by reducing informational 
asymmetries between issuers and the investors.14 If the reputation of a 
gatekeeper is good, the investor trusts the information being provided 
and will use it in deciding whether and how much to invest in an issuer 
or in the market as a whole.15 
It would seem then that gatekeepers would have very little reason 
to risk their valuable reputations by knowingly aiding their clients to 
commit fraud.16 However, as high profile gatekeeper failures in debacles 
such as Refco, Enron, and WorldCom prove, this is not always the 
case.17 
These debacles took place during an era in which the threat of 
litigation against gatekeepers was substantially reduced, an era that 
continues to this day.18 In 1994, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs 
could no longer bring civil actions for aiding and abetting securities 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Jonathan Macey, The Value of Reputation in Corporate Finance and 
Investment Banking (and the Related Roles of Regulation and Market Efficiency), 22 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 18, 18 (Fall 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1733798. 
 13. Jonathan Macey, The Demise of the Reputational Model in Capital Markets: 
The Problem of the “Last Period Parasites”, 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 427, 436 (2010) 
[hereinafter Demise of the Reputational Model]. 
 14. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 9. 
 15. See Macey, supra note 12, at 19. 
 16. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that “reputational intermediaries face 
losses that exceed the likely one-time gain from acquiescence in fraud . . . ”). 
 17. See generally In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), aff’d sub nom. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 
(2d Cir. 2010) (lawyers helped to fraudulently conceal massive company debt); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 439 F. Supp. 2d 692 (S.D. Tex. 2006) 
(accountants helped to fraudulently conceal debt and create the appearance that Enron 
was healthy); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (auditors aided fraud by certifying company’s fraudulent financial statements). 
 18. See Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial 
Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors 
of Securities Fraud, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 437, 467 (2011) (lamenting that without a 
private right of action, only the SEC can enforce aiding and abetting liability, but the 
SEC cannot pursue all such cases). 
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fraud.19 A year later, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),20 which restored the SEC’s ability to 
bring aiding and abetting claims, but not those of private plaintiffs.21 In 
the years that followed, evidence suggests that accounting firms lowered 
risk management standards and adopted less conservative reporting 
policies.22 Few gatekeepers took precautions to protect their reputational 
capital and many relaxed risk management standards that had previously 
been in place.23 
In seeking to answer the question of why gatekeepers help their 
clients commit fraud, notable commentators such as Professor John C. 
Coffee, Jr. of Columbia University School of Law, Professor Jonathan 
Macey of Yale University School of Law, and Professor Frank Partnoy 
of the University of San Diego School of Law have looked to the theory 
of reputational capital.24 The theory puts forth that a firm’s reputation is 
a valuable capital asset that is “pledged or placed at risk by the 
gatekeeper’s vouching for its client’s assertions or projections.”25 And 
just like any other form of capital, the value of reputational capital can 
rise or fall depending on several factors, including (significantly) the 
risk of litigation.26 When the risk of litigation is low, the expected cost 
to a gatekeeper of acquiescing to a client’s fraud is decreased.27 For this 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994). 
 20. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 21. See id. § 104 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012)). 
 22. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-138, 
REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 
U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS: TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, 
REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES, 6 (October 2002), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03138.pdf (last accessed Nov. 28, 2014) [hereinafter 
GAO STUDY]. 
 23. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 317. 
 24. See generally COFFEE, supra note 2; Macey, supra note 12; Demise of the 
Reputational Model, supra note 13; Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A 
Proposal for A Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) 
(elaborating on the theory of reputational capital and how the theory helps to explain 
why gatekeepers would aid and abet fraud). 
 25. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See John C. Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 337 (2004) [hereinafter Gatekeeper 
Failure]. 
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reason primarily, the private right to bring a Rule 10b-5 action for aiding 
and abetting liability should be restored by Congress.28 
Part I of this Note will examine gatekeeper liability under the 
federal securities laws and its development since the enactments of the 
‘33 Act and ‘34 Act. Part II will examine current theories about 
reputational capital and why gatekeepers choose to acquiesce to their 
clients’ securities frauds. In Part III, I argue that if one accepts the 
theory that gatekeepers serve as reputational intermediaries, as the 
courts seem to do, then the case for reinstating private liability gains 
new urgency. 
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF GATEKEEPER LIABILITY UNDER THE 
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent 
Great Depression, Congress enacted The Securities Act of 1933 (“the 
‘33 Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“the ‘34 Act).29 The 
‘33 Act established registration requirements for securities issued on the 
primary market.30 The ‘34 Act provided for the regulation of securities 
trading, exchanges, and broker-dealers, and it established the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).31 The four most important 
provisions for the imposition of liability upon gatekeepers for securities 
violations are Sections 11, 12(a)(1), and 12(a)(2) of the ‘33 Act, and 
Section 10(b) under the ‘34 Act.32 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See Klock, supra note 18, at 493 (calling for the same action by Congress). 
 29. Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(a): Striking A 
Balance of Interests for Plaintiffs and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 109, 111-
12 (2005). 
 30. THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[3][A] (6th ed. 
2009). 
 31. Id. § 1.2[3][B]. 
 32. Carsten Gerner-Beuerle, The Market for Securities and Its Regulation Through 
Gatekeepers, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 317, 333 (2009). 
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A. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 
1. Section 11 
Section 11 of the ‘33 Act imposes strict liability on issuers for any 
material misstatement or omission in a registration statement.33 It also 
provides an express private right of action against “every accountant, 
engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to 
a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as 
having prepared or certified any part of [such] registration statement . . . 
.”34 Through this provision, Congress arguably recognized a deterrence 
role for the gatekeeping professions in preventing the filing of materially 
false or misleading registration statements.35 However, Section 11 also 
provides a due diligence defense for gatekeepers which can relieve them 
of liability if the defense is properly established.36 So while Section 11 is 
a strict liability regime for issuers, it is only a fault-based liability 
regime for gatekeepers.37 
Furthermore, the courts will find gatekeepers liable under Section 
11 only in very specific circumstances.38 In McFarland v. Memorex 
Corp., the district court held that “there is no accountant liability unless . 
. . misleading data [certified by the accountant in the registration 
statement] can be expressly attributed to the accountant.”39 Therefore, 
                                                                                                                 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1) (2012). 
 34. Id. § 77k(a)(4). 
 35. See Shuenn (Patrick) Ho, A Missed Opportunity for “Wall Street Reform”: 
Secondary Liability for Securities Fraud After the Dodd-Frankact, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 175, 184 (2012) (“In the past, Congress has recognized that gatekeepers are 
uniquely placed to detect and block fraudulent transactions and explicitly adopted a 
strategy of imposing civil liability on gatekeepers such as accountants and appraisers to 
deter the filing of false securities registration statements.”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 
77k(a)(1)(4)). 
 36. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3). 
 37. Tuch, supra note 10, at 1636. 
 38. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983); 
McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp. 631, 643 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (holding that 
“there is no accountant liability unless . . . misleading data can be expressly attributed 
to the accountant”); Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (attorneys who help prepare a registration statement generally cannot be held 
liable under Section 11 unless they act as “experts”). 
 39. McFarland, 493 F. Supp. at 643. 
2015] TARNISHED REPUTATIONS: GATEKEEPER 753 
LIABILITY AFTER JANUS 
 
Section 11 liability will not apply to an accountant unless she is an 
auditor or has otherwise lent her name to a registration statement.40 
Similarly, attorneys who help prepare a registration statement 
generally cannot be held liable under Section 11 unless they act as 
“experts”41 or if they also serve as directors or officers of the company.42 
A non-director, non-officer attorney is an “expert” within Section 11’s 
statutory meaning only if she “expertises” a portion of the registration 
statement, usually by providing a legal opinion that is included within 
the statement.43 
2. Section 12(a)(1) 
Section 12(a)(1) of the ‘33 Act provides that “[a]ny person who . . . 
offers or sells a security in violation of [Section 544] . . . shall be liable . . 
. to the person purchasing such security from him . . . .”45 This provision 
makes available an express private right of action for a purchaser against 
a seller of securities found to be in violation of Section 5.46 In effect, 
Section 12(a)(1) was designed to enforce the registration requirements 
of Section 5.47 
In Pinter v. Dahl, the Supreme Court held that “‘seller’ is not 
limited to an owner who passes title . . . but extends to a broker or other 
person who successfully solicits a purchase of securities, so long as he is 
motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests 
or those of the securities owner.”48 So, theoretically, a gatekeeper as 
agent for the securities owner could be held liable under Section 
12(a)(1) so long as she solicits the purchase of a security that is in 
                                                                                                                 
 40. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.3[10]. 
 41. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 386 n.22. 
 42. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.3[10]. 
 43. Ben D. Orlanski, Whose Representations Are These Anyway? Attorney 
Prospectus Liability After Central Bank, 42 UCLA L. REV. 885, 904 (1995); see also 
BarChris, 283 F. Supp. at 683 (“To say that the entire registration statement is 
expertised because some lawyer prepared it would be an unreasonable construction of 
the statute.”). 
 44. Section 5 of the ‘33 Act provides that all securities not exempted from doing so 
by other provisions in the Act must be registered. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1). 
 46. Id.; see also HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.2[1]. 
 47. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.2[1]. 
 48. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988). 
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violation of Section 5.49 However, on its face, Section 12(a)(1) imposes 
a privity requirement, and the Pinter Court recognized such in its 
opinion.50 Thus, the mere participation by a gatekeeper in the 
preparation of a registration statement is not enough to trigger liability 
under Section 12(a)(1).51 Indeed, even the substantial involvement in 
such preparation will not create liability unless the gatekeeper is also 
actively involved in the negotiations leading to the sale in question.52 
Damages under Section 12(a) are limited to “the consideration paid for 
[the] security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income 
received thereon.”53 
3. Section 12(a)(2) 
Section 12(a)(2) of the ‘33 Act imposes the same level of liability 
as 12(a)(1) for those who offer or sell securities and, in doing so, make 
omissions or untrue statements of material fact in prospectuses or oral 
communications.54 Just as in actions under 12(a)(1), gatekeepers must 
also be “sellers” under § 12(a)(2) in order to be found liable.55 Section 
12(a)(2) is viewed as a strict liability provision,56 and unlike fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. at 642 (“At the very least . . . the language of § 12[(a)](1) contemplates 
a buyer-seller relationship not unlike traditional contractual privity.”). 
 51. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.2[2]. 
 52. See In re DDi Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 03-7063, 2005 WL 3090882, at *18 
(C.D. Cal. July 21, 2005); see also Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360 (5th Cir. 
1981) (holding an attorney to be “an active negotiator in the transaction” and liable 
under Section 12(a)(1)). 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2012). 
 54. See id. § 77l(a)(2); Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 262 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (“In order to establish a section 12(2) violation, a plaintiff must show that (1) 
defendants offered or sold a security, (2) by the use of any means of communication in 
interstate commerce; (3) through a prospectus or oral communication; (4) by making a 
false or misleading statement of a material fact or by omitting to state a material fact; 
(5) plaintiff did not know of the untruth or omission; and (6) defendants knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care could have known of the untruth or omission.”). 
 55. See In re Morgan Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 
2010) (“. . . the list of potential defendants in a section 12(a)(2) case is governed by a 
judicial interpretation of section 12 known as the ‘statutory seller’ requirement.”) 
(citing Pinter, 486 U.S. at 643-47). 
 56. See Jack E. Karns et. al., Accountant and Attorney Liability As “Sellers” of 
Securities Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: Judicial Rejection of the 
Statutory, Collateral Participant Status Cause of Action, 74 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) 
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claims under Rule 10b-5,57 it is not necessary for the plaintiff to show 
either his or her own reliance or scienter on the part of the defendant.58 
However, Section 12(a)(2) also offers defendants an affirmative defense 
if they can “sustain the burden of proof that [they] did not know, and in 
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of [the] untruth or 
omission.”59 “Reasonable care” connotes negligence liability for 
gatekeeper sellers facing an action under §12(a)(2).60 Such gatekeepers 
will be held liable unless they can show that their actions were 
reasonable, not just without recklessness or intent.61 
B. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 – SECTION 10(B) AND RULE 
10B-5 
As can be seen, the ‘33 Act provides liability for gatekeepers only 
under specific limited circumstances.62 Gatekeepers have liability under 
the ‘33 Act (1) where the gatekeeper has made false statements in a 
registration statement that can be attributed to her, and (2) where the 
gatekeeper is an active seller of a security and the security is either 
unregistered and nonexempt, or the gatekeeper has made material 
misstatements or omissions in oral communications or in the security’s 
prospectus.63 Gatekeepers who commit securities fraud outside of these 
circumstances are most often subject to liability under Section 10(b) of 
the ‘34 Act.64. 
                                                                                                                 
(“The reason that investors have persistently sought to establish liability against 
attorneys and accountants under section 12, is that the provision is viewed as imposing 
strict liability on anyone violating it.”). 
 57. See infra Part II.B. 
 58. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.6[1]; see also Wright, 953 F.2d at 262 (“. . . reliance 
on alleged misrepresentations or omissions is not an element of a section 12[(a)](2) 
cause of action.”). 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). In 2005, the SEC promulgated a rule clarifying that the 
“know, and . . . could not have known” language of § 12(a)(2) means “knowing at the 
time of sale.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.159(c). 
 60. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2); see also Partnoy, supra note 24, at 515 (“. . . § 12(a)(2) 
imposes negligence liability on issuers and gatekeepers selling a security using a 
prospectus (or oral statement) that is false or misleading . . . .”). 
 61. Partnoy, supra note 24, at 515. 
 62. See supra Part I.A. 
 63. See infra Part II.A. 
 64. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy’s Complaint: A Response, 84 B.U. L. REV. 377, 
378 (2004) (“. . . most securities class actions are brought . . . with respect to the 
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Section 10(b) makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or 
indirectly, . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe . . . .”65 In 1942, the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b-5 pursuant to its statutory authority under 10(b).66 Rule 10b-5 
makes it unlawful through the use of an instrumentality or interstate 
commerce: 
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o 
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or (c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.67 
The language of Rule 10b-5 has been described as open-ended and 
adaptable, allowing it to reach a wide variety of fraudulent schemes.68 
1. Primary vs. Secondary Liability 
Generally, most securities violations have multiple participants, 
ranging from directors, officers, and employees of a corporation to 
                                                                                                                 
secondary market (where scienter must be proven before the issuer can be held liable 
under Rule 10b-5).”); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 62 
(2003) (“The general prohibition on fraud under Rule 10b-5 covers an unlimited 
number of transactions and an undefined range of capital-market participants.”); 
Evaluating S. 1551: The Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 
2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2-4 (2009) (testimony of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. 
Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School) (commenting that most 
fraud by gatekeepers will go undetected if the private right of action for aiding and 
abetting liability under § 10(b) is not restored) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1551]. 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(2)(b). Section 10(b) is often described as a “catchall” 
provision. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (“Section 
10(b) is aptly described as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”). 
 66. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 695 
(7th ed. 2013). 
 67. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2015). 
 68. See Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 As an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM 
L. REV. S7, S19-S21 (1993) (describing the benefits of the ambiguity of Rule 10b-5’s 
language). 
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members of the gatekeeping professions whose services are employed 
by such a corporation.69 In a securities fraud action, the participants are 
classified as either primary violators or secondary violators.70 “A 
primary violator commits the act proscribed by the statute or rule; a 
secondary violator either assists or supports the primary violator . . . .”71 
A primary violation of Rule 10b-5 consists of six elements that a 
plaintiff has the burden of showing: “(1) a material misrepresentation or 
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) 
reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and 
(6) loss causation.”72 In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that gatekeepers such as 
lawyers, accountants, and bankers could be held liable as primary 
violators provided that “all of the requirements for primary liability 
under Rule 10b-5 are met.”73 However, most gatekeeper defendants are 
alleged to be secondary violators.74 
2. Aiding and Abetting Liability 
Gatekeeper defendants in Rule 10b-5 actions are generally alleged 
to be liable under aiding and abetting theories of secondary liability.75 
Prior to the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Act PSLRA of 
1995 (“the PSLRA”),76 the SEC brought aiding and abetting claims 
mostly under concepts that were well-established in criminal law77 and 
                                                                                                                 
 69. COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 795. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (italics in the original). 
 72. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 
n.3 (2011). 
 73. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994). 
 74. See COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 795 (listing secondary violators as “lawyers, 
accountants, and banks, to mention just a few . . . .”); see also Ho, supra note 35, at 
183-84 (discussing the rationale for extending secondary liability to gatekeepers such as 
“auditors, credit rating agencies, investment bankers, and lawyers . . . ”). 
 75. COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 796. 
 76. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 77. See, e.g., SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939) 
(permitting aiding and abetting due to the precedent set in criminal cases). 
758 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XX 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
under joint tortfeasor liability theories developed in tort law.78 Later, in 
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., the court concluded 
that the failure of Congress to enact specific language pertaining to 
aiding and abetting liability did not establish that such liability could not 
be imposed under Rule 10b-5.79 Therefore, the court held that aiding and 
abetting claims could proceed in actions under the Rule.80 
A gatekeeper is found to be liable for aiding and abetting when she 
has knowingly or recklessly81 provided “substantial assistance” to a 
primary violator.82 The courts have generally required the satisfaction of 
three elements in order to successfully bring an aiding and abetting 
claim: “1) a violation by a primary violator; 2) knowledge by the 
secondary violator of the violation; and 3) the rendering of substantial 
assistance by the secondary violator.”83 
a. The Private Right of Action for Aiding and Abetting Liability 
The ‘34 Act does not expressly provide a private right of action 
under section 10(b).84 However, shortly after the SEC promulgated Rule 
10b-5, the federal courts beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum 
Co. started recognizing an implied private right of action for violations 
                                                                                                                 
 78. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws-
Aiding and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law 
Principles and the Statutory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, 321-22 (1989) (“Although 
aiding and abetting liability generally is not provided expressly for under the federal 
securities laws, courts almost universally have been willing to infer joint tortfeasor 
liability for aiding and abetting, utilizing the statement of liability in section 876(b) of 
the Restatement.”) (internal citations omitted). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 
(1979) provides that “[f]or harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of 
another, one is subject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a 
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to 
conduct himself . . . .” 
 79. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (N.D. 
Ind. 1966). 
 80. Id. 
 81. The Dodd-Frank Act added the words “or recklessly” after the word 
“knowingly” in § 20(e) of the ‘34 Act. See infra note 181. 
 82. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012). 
 83. Kuehnle, supra note 78, at 322 (citing cases articulating various formulations 
of the three elements). 
 84. Ronald J. Colombo, Cooperation with Securities Fraud, 61 ALA. L. REV. 61, 
67 (2009). 
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of the rule.85 The Kardon court applied the tort law principle that the 
performance of an act prohibited by a statute that is meant to protect a 
third party’s interest makes the actor liable for the invasion of that 
interest.86 The court reasoned that since the entire ‘34 Act disclosed a 
broad purpose to eliminate manipulative or deceptive practices from 
securities transactions of all kinds, then the intention of the ‘34 Act 
therefore could not be to deny a remedy for such practices to private 
plaintiffs.87 
In 1971, the Supreme Court gave formal recognition to this private 
right of action in Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York v. 
Bankers Life and Casualty Company.88 With this recognition came the 
ability for private plaintiffs to bring Rule 10b-5 actions against 
gatekeepers under aiding and abetting theories of liability, and plaintiffs 
routinely did so.89 
However, shortly after recognizing the implied right of action, the 
Supreme Court began to pare it back.90 The Court’s recognition in 
Superintendent came at a time when its willingness to recognize implied 
private rights of action had started to wane.91 Four years after 
Superintendent, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, the Court 
ruled that in order to maintain a private action under Rule 10b-5, the 
plaintiff must be either a purchaser or seller of the security or securities 
at issue.92 In a seeming rebuke to the reasoning of the Kardon court, 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 86. Id. at 513. 
 87. Id. at 514. 
 88. 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is now established that a private right of action is 
implied under § 10(b).”). 
 89. See COX ET AL., supra note 66, at 796 (“For three decades [before Central Bank 
in 1994], accountants, lawyers, underwriters, banks, and others were routinely held 
liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the [‘34 Act] on the ground [that] they had 
aided and abetted their client’s violation.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 
(1975) (discussed herein); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 187-88 (1976) 
(discussed herein). 
 91. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 (2001) (“. . . we have 
retreated from our previous willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has 
not provided one . . . . Just last Term it was noted that we ‘abandoned’ the view of 
Borak decades ago, and have repeatedly declined to ‘revert’ to ‘the understanding of 
private causes of action that held sway 40 years ago.’” (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 
532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001))). 
 92. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 754-55. 
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Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion expressed reservations about 
implying any Congressional intent to provide a private remedy under 
Section 10(b).93 
A year later, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, the Court held that 
plaintiffs must show that the defendant acted with scienter; mere 
negligence would not be enough.94 In that case, the plaintiffs brought an 
action against the defendant accounting firm for aiding and abetting a 
brokerage in conducting a fraudulent securities scheme.95 In light of its 
holding that a showing of scienter is required for such claims, the Court 
reserved the question of whether civil liability for aiding and abetting 
was appropriate under Rule 10b-5.96 However, eighteen years later, the 
Court finally addressed that issue.97 
b. Central Bank 
By 1994, every circuit court that considered the question 
recognized the existence of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-
5.98 But to the surprise of the litigation bar99 and other observers,100 the 
Supreme Court reversed the course of such jurisprudence in Central 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.101 In that case, the 
Court held that “a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and 
abetting suit under section 10(b)” because “the text of § 10(b) does not 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See id. at 737 (“. . . it would be disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1942 foreordained the present state 
of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5. It is therefore proper that we consider . . . what 
may be described as policy considerations when we come to flesh out the portions of 
the law with respect to which neither the congressional enactment nor the 
administrative regulations offer conclusive guidance.”). Rehnquist also stated that 
“[w]hen we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial oak 
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Id. 
 94. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 187-88. 
 95. Id. at 188-90. 
 96. Id. at 191 n.7. Six years later, the Court had another chance to reach the 
question but again declined to do so. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375, 379 n.5 (1983). 
 97. See Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 
(1994) (discussed herein). 
 98. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.13[1][A]. 
 99. Cox ET AL., supra note 66, at 796. 
 100. HAZEN, supra note 30, § 7.13[1][A]. 
 101. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 191. 
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prohibit aiding and abetting.”102 In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected 
the holding and reasoning of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life 
Insurance.103 The Court noted its more recent decisions in Ernst & Ernst 
and another case,104 where it paid “close attention to the statutory text in 
defining the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b) . . . .”105 The Court 
ruled that the text of the statute controls its decision regarding such 
scope and that a “private plaintiff may not bring a 10b-5 suit against a 
defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b).”106 Thus, private 
plaintiffs could no longer bring aiding and abetting claims against 
gatekeepers in Rule 10b-5 actions.107 
c. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) 
While the Court’s decision in Central Bank only expressly 
prohibited private plaintiffs from bringing aiding and abetting claims 
under section 10(b), the Court’s reasoning that such claims were not 
within the scope of section 10(b)’s statutory text also on its face applied 
to SEC enforcement actions under 10(b).108 Fearing that this was now 
the case,109 Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (“the PSLRA”).110 The act amended section 20(e) of the ‘34 
Act to give the SEC the express authority to bring aiding and abetting 
claims against those who provided “substantial assistance” to primary 
violators.111 However, the PSLRA failed to reinstate the private right of 
action to bring such claims.112 At the time of publication of this Note, 
private plaintiffs still cannot bring aiding and abetting claims under Rule 
10b-5 against gatekeepers; only the SEC can do so.113 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. at 191. 
 103. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 104. Santa Fe Indus, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977). 
 105. Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 169. 
 106. Id. at 173. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 192 (reasoning that the text of section 10(b) itself does not prohibit 
aiding and abetting). 
 109. Matthew P. Wynne, Rule 10b-5(b) Enforcement Actions in Light of Janus: 
Making the Case for Agency Deference, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2111, 2120 (2013). 
 110. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 111. Id. § 104 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(f) (2012)). 
 112. Wynne, supra note 109, at 2120. 
 113. Klock, supra note 18, at 467. 
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Not only did the PSLRA fail to restore a private right of action for 
Rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting claims, it also heightened pleading 
standards for scienter by requiring that plaintiffs “state with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”114 Congress was concerned that securities 
litigation had become too “lawyer-driven,” leading to excessive legal 
fees and plaintiffs who were unrepresentative of the class in which they 
served as the named plaintiff.115 Under this standard, a plaintiff must 
plead with particularity each statement alleged to be misleading and the 
basis of the plaintiff’s belief as to why the alleged statements were 
misleading.116 Additionally, the PSLRA replaced joint and several 
liability with proportionate liability.117 
d. The Aftermath of Central Bank and the PSLRA 
After the enactment of the PSLRA, there was a significant drop-off 
in the number of securities class action suits filed against at least one 
type of gatekeeper: accountants.118 A 1997 SEC study of the PSLRA’s 
impact on securities litigation found a substantial decrease in the number 
of securities class actions following passage of the PSLRA.119 From 
1990 through 1992, the study found that the total number of audit-
related suits filed against the then Big Six accounting120 firms each year 
                                                                                                                 
 114. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(A); see also Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the 
Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance Between Primary and Secondary Actor Liability 
Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019, 1029-30 (2012) (PSLRA was enacted 
in 1995 and included “a heightened pleading standard for allegations of scienter in 
section 10(b) cases.”). The accounting industry lobbied aggressively for the passage of 
the PSLRA. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 363. 
 115. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 337. 
 116. Cosenza, supra note 114, at 1030. 
 117. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 § 201, 
109 Stat. at 758-62. 
 118. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE 
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 2, 73 (1997), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt [hereinafter SEC STUDY]. 
 119. Id. at 1. 
 120. “The Big Six firms were Arthur Andersen LLP, Deloitte &Touche LLP, Ernst 
& Young LLP, KPMG LLP, Price Waterhouse, and Coopers Lybrand.” COFFEE, supra 
note 2, at 73 n.33. 
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were “192, 171, and 141, respectively.”121 However, the study found that 
in 1996, the year after the PSLRA was enacted, out of 105 total class-
action securities suits that year, accounting firms were named in just six 
of them.122 
In his book, Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate 
Governance,123 Professor John C. Coffee Jr. of Columbia University 
discusses other accounting studies that show an increase in risky 
practices in the accounting industry.124 In the early 1990s, major 
accounting firms were trying to reduce their exposure to litigation by 
adopting more cautious risk management policies.125 This included 
eliminating riskier companies from client rosters.126 However, after the 
passage of the PSLRA, the industry relaxed its risk management 
policies, took on riskier client portfolios, and its reporting strategies 
became less conservative.127 Professor Coffee summarizes these findings 
by remarking that “litigation exposure and accounting conservatism 
seem to be positively correlated.”128 
Indeed, there was also a marked increase in the number of financial 
restatements (i.e. companies issuing corrections to previously reported 
financial statements) in the years immediately following passage of the 
PSLRA.129 One study shows that financial restatements increased from 
an average of forty-nine per year from 1990 to 1997, to a total of ninety-
one in 1998, 150 in 1999, and 156 in 2000.130 Another study from the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) found that from January 1997 to 
June 2002, approximately “ten percent of all listed companies 
announced at least one restatement.”131 Companies that issued a 
restatement during this time period suffered on average an immediate 
                                                                                                                 
 121. SEC STUDY, supra note 118, at 21. 
 122. Id. 
 123. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 61. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 57. 
 130. See George B. Moriarty & Phillip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the 
Quality of Financial Reporting, 17 FIN. EXEC. 53, 54 (July/August 2001), available at 
EBSCOhost, Accession No. 11873640. 
 131. See GAO STUDY, supra note 22, at 4. 
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ten percent decline in their stock prices,132 suggesting that investors were 
surprised and reacted by selling shares and sharply lowering the market 
value of restating companies.133 In 2002, eighty-five percent of all 
identified restatements came from companies listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ,134 suggesting that such restatements were not confined to 
small inexperienced companies but instead reflected increased risk-
taking at larger more mature firms.135 The GAO found that the dominant 
reason for financial restatements from 1997 to 2002 was revenue 
recognition (i.e. misreported or non-reported revenue) issues, which 
accounted for thirty-nine percent of restatements.136 Restatements 
involving revenue recognition led to greater market losses than other 
types of restatements, accounting for over half of immediate market 
losses.137 Attempts by management to prematurely recognize revenue 
became the dominant cause of financial restatements.138 
This period of lower risk management and riskier business 
practices by accounting firms culminated with the back-to-back 
accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom, respectively.139 
e. Stoneridge 
After Central Bank and the passage of the PSLRA, plaintiff-
investors sought new theories to hold secondary actors liable for 
securities violations.140 One such theory was “scheme liability.”141 Under 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. at 5 (measuring stock prices on the basis of a company’s three-day price 
movement starting from the trading day before the announcement and ending at the 
trading day following the announcement). 
 133. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 59. 
 134. GAO STUDY, supra note 22, at 4. 
 135. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 58. 
 136. GAO STUDY, supra note 22, at 5. The other reason categories were 
“Cost/Expense” (15.7%), “Other” (14.1%), “Restructuring/assets/inventory” (8.9%), 
“Acquisition/merger” (5.9%), “Securities-related” (5.4%), “Reclassification” (5.1%), 
“In-process research and development” (3.6%), and “Related-party transactions” 
(3.0%). See id. at 21-22 (figures and full definitions of these reason categories). 
 137. Id. at 5. 
 138. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 59. 
 139. See id. at 16 (discussing how Congress increased regulations on auditors with 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act after the Enron and Worldcom scandals). 
 140. Cosenza, supra note 114, at 1050. 
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this theory, plaintiffs sought to use Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c)142 to hold 
secondary actors primarily liable if they commit a deceptive act in the 
process of aiding a primary violation.143 
However, in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, the court held that such a theory of scheme liability was not 
valid under section 10(b).144 The plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
Motorola and Scientific-Atlanta knowingly falsified contracts with 
defendant Charter Communications, Inc. in a scheme to artificially 
inflate earnings figures on Charter’s financial statements.145 The court 
found that the plaintiffs did not establish the reliance element of primary 
liability because they did not rely on the statements of Motorola and 
Scientific-Atlanta.146 Therefore, the two defendants were not liable 
under Rule 10b-5.147 The Court reasoned that if it adopted scheme 
liability, it would in substance revive the private right of action for 
aiding and abetting that Central Bank had struck down and Congress 
had declined to revive in the PSLRA.148 The Court stated that the 
decision to expand the private right of action is for Congress, not the 
Court.149 Thus, a potential theory for holding gatekeepers liable under 
Rule 10b-5 as primary violators was quashed.150 
f. Janus 
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the 
plaintiff shareholders contended that Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCM) 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. at 1051-52; see also In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., 
439 F. Supp. 2d 692, 723 (S.D. Tex. 2006) (court considers “the issue of loss causation 
in scheme liability”). 
 142. See infra Part II.B. 
 143. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 162 (2008). 
 144. Id. at 162-63. 
 145. Id. at 153-55. 
 146. Id. at 159. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 162-63 (“Petitioner’s view of primary liability makes any aider and 
abettor liable under § 10(b) if he or she committed a deceptive act in the process of 
providing assistance. Were we to adopt this construction of § 10(b), it would revive in 
substance the implied cause of action against all aiders and abettors except those who 
committed no deceptive act in the process of facilitating the fraud . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). 
 149. Id. at 165. 
 150. Klock, supra note 18, at 453. 
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and its subsidiary, Janus Capital Management LLC (JCM) “materially 
mislead the investing public” with statements that they made in 
prospectuses for a family of mutual funds organized in a trust under the 
name Janus Investment Funds.151 After the Fourth Circuit reversed the 
lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari “to address whether JCM can be held liable in a 
private action under Rule 10b–5 for false statements included in Janus 
Investment Fund’s prospectuses.”152 The Court stated that “[u]nder Rule 
10b–5, it is unlawful for ‘any person, directly or indirectly, ... 
[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact’ in connection with the 
purchase or sale of securities. [citation omitted.].”153 To be liable, 
therefore, the Court said that JCM must have “made” the material 
misstatements in the prospectuses.” 154 
The Court held that JCM, even though it administered the fund and 
prepared the prospectuses, did not “make” the statements within them 
that the plaintiffs alleged were false.155 The Court ruled that for claims 
under Rule 10b-5 alleging that a person made false statements, the 
“maker” of a statement “is the person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”156 The Court further stated that “[o]ne who prepares or 
publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker.”157 The 
Court analogized its rule tothe relationship between a speaker and a 
speechwriter: “[e]ven when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is 
entirely within the control of the person who delivers it[, a]nd it is the 
speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what is ultimately said.”158 In 
a footnote, the Court explained that it was drawing 
a clean line between [those who are primarily liable (and thus may 
be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and 
thus may not be pursued in private suits)]—the maker is the person 
                                                                                                                 
 151. 131 S. Ct. 2297, 2301 (2011). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 2302. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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or entity with ultimate authority over a statement and others are 
not.159 
Thus, to be held primarily liable under Rule 10b-5 for a materially 
false or misleading statement, a gatekeeper must have “ultimate 
authority” over that statement.160 
C. SARBANES-OXLEY AND DODD-FRANK 
Two recent major pieces of legislation have attempted to increase 
liability for and regulation of gatekeepers. This subsection examines 
them. 
1. Sarbanes-Oxley  
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response to the 
waves of massive corporate accounting scandals from that time period 
such as Enron and WorldCom.161 The purpose of the legislation was to 
redesign the network of institutions and intermediaries that served 
investors in the capital markets in order to reduce deception and fraud.162 
Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB).163 The PCAOB is charged with establishing quality 
control, auditing, and independence standards for accountants that 
perform auditing services for public companies.164 It is also charged with 
inspecting registered public accounting firms and establishing 
disciplinary procedures for auditors and their firms.165 Section 102 of 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 2302 n.6. 
 160. See, e.g., SEC v. Garber, 959 F. Supp. 2d 374, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); SEC v. 
Merkin, No. 11-23585-CIV, 2012 WL 5245561, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2012); SEC v. 
Boyd, No. 95-CV-03174-MSK-MJW, 2012 WL 1060034, at *7 (D. Colo. Mar. 29, 
2012), reconsideration denied, No. 95-CV-03174-MSK-MJW, 2012 WL 4955244 (D. 
Colo. Oct. 17, 2012) (“Under Janus, an attorney who prepares a false statement to be 
disseminated to investors can be liable for the contents of that statement if the attorney 
has the ultimate authority over the contents and dissemination of the statement, but not 
where the attorney is simply preparing the statement at the direction of a client who is 
controlling the contents of that statement.”). 
 161. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 16. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. Law 107-204 § 101, 116 Stat. 745, 750 
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2012)). 
 164. Id. § 103, 116 Stat. at 755 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 7213). 
 165. Id. §§ 104-105, 116 Stat. at 757-759 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214-7215). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley requires all accounting firms that conduct audits of 
public companies to be registered with the PCAOB.166 This section 
essentially gives the PCAOB jurisdiction over every accounting firm in 
the industry.167 Commenters have suggested that the key to the 
PCAOB’s success is its resistance to agency capture.168 
Sarbanes-Oxley also took several steps to curtail conflicts of 
interest for auditors.169 Section 201 prohibits accounting firms from 
providing specific services to its audit clients, including management 
functions, human resources, appraisal services, fairness opinions, and 
legal services.170 The same section also prohibits accounting firms from 
performing audits on companies whose officers used to work for the 
accounting firm and participated in their current companies’ audits.171 
Finally, Section 301 called for issuers’ independent audit committees to 
handle control and supervision of their outside auditors.172 
Sarbanes-Oxley also gave the SEC greater authority to regulate 
securities lawyers.173 Section 307 of the law authorizes the SEC to 
establish “minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys 
appearing and practicing before the Commission.”174 Sarbanes-Oxley 
also established a “reporting up” requirement for securities lawyers.175 
Attorneys are required to report evidence of “material” securities law 
violations by a company to its chief legal counsel or the CEO.176 If the 
latter two parties do not “appropriately respond,” then the attorney is 
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. § 102(a), 116 Stat. at 753 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7212(a)). 
 167. Celia R. Taylor, Breaking the Bank: Reconsidering Central Bank of Denver 
After Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley, 71 MO. L. REV. 367, 381 (2006). 
 168. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules 
Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003) (discussing the 
PCAOB, “[t]he agency delegation model works well only so long as the agency 
successfully resists capture by the interests of the actors it regulates”). 
 169. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 333. 
 170. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(g), 116 Stat. 771 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g)). 
 171. Id. § 206(l) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(l)). 
 172. Id. § 301(m)(3)(A) 116 Stat. 771 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3)(A)); see also Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 27, at 336 (explaining how 
Sarbanes-Oxley transferred control and supervision of auditors to the audit committee 
to address concerns about management compromising auditors). 
 173. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245) 
(discussed herein). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Taylor, supra note 167, at 383. 
 176. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
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required to report the evidence to the independent auditing committee of 
the company’s board of directors.177 
As a result of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC promulgated Rule 102(e) 
enabling the Commission to sanction gatekeepers for negligent 
behavior.178 However, Sarbanes-Oxley did nothing to enhance litigation 
remedies for private plaintiffs under Rule 10b-5.179 
2. Dodd-Frank 
In response to the 2008 Financial Crisis, Congress enacted the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank”) in 2010.180 Its primary impact on gatekeeper liability was to 
expand the scienter requirement of aiding and abetting liability from 
“knowingly” to “knowingly or recklessly.”181 This was done to counter 
“plausible deniability” defenses by gatekeepers who would argue that 
they merely served as functionaries to primary violators and did not 
meet the “knowledge” requirement of scienter.182 
Dodd-Frank also affects credit ratings agencies in two ways.183 
First, it lowers pleading standards for plaintiffs in actions against credit 
rating agencies.184 Second, it expressly establishes that “the enforcement 
and penalty provisions of the ‘34 Act shall apply to statements made by 
a credit rating agency in the same manner and to the same extent as such 
provisions apply to statements made by a registered public accounting 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Id. Section 10A of the ‘34 Act imposes similar duties on auditors. The auditor 
is required to report evidence of a material illegal action to the issuer’s management. If 
the auditor later discovers that the illegal act is material, the auditor must report this fact 
to management, who then has one business day to inform the SEC and to provide notice 
to the auditor of doing so. If the auditor does not receive such notice, then she must 
either resign or provide the SEC with a report of her findings. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(b). 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(iv). 
 179. Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 27, at 336 (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley does 
nothing to increase the deterrent threat for gatekeepers). 
 180. Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES, July 
22, 2010, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/ 
22regulate.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print. 
 181. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. Law 111-
203, § 929O, 124 Stat. 1376, 1861 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)) [hereinafter Dodd-
Frank]. 
 182. Tuch, supra note 10, at 1655. 
 183. See infra notes 186-87. 
 184. Dodd-Frank § 933(b), 124 Stat. 1883 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)(B)). 
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firm or a securities analyst under the securities laws.”185 Once again 
though, Congress deferred reinstating the private right of action for 
aiding and abetting liability.186 
II. GATEKEEPERS AND REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL 
This Part explains the theory developed by several noteworthy 
commentators that gatekeepers serve as reputational intermediaries. It 
examines the theory that a gatekeeper’s reputation is a capital asset and 
explains why it is sometimes rational for a gatekeeper to deplete its 
reputational capital by acquiescing to a client’s fraud. 
A. THE REPUTATION MODEL 
Under reputation theory, in industries where trust is essential, a 
gatekeeper’s reputation is considered a valuable capital asset.187 It can be 
“pledged or placed at risk by the gatekeeper’s vouching for its client’s 
assertions or projections.”188 Gatekeepers are trusted to the extent that 
they are repeat players who possess significant reputational capital that 
may be lost or destroyed if they are found to have condoned or aided 
wrongdoing.189 The model assumes that new companies begin without 
any reputation and must build it over time.190 If they wish to stay in 
business for the long-run, then they must invest in, develop, and 
maintain a good reputation.191 As long as the value of that reputational 
capital exceeds the expected profit from the client, the gatekeeper 
should remain faithful to shareholders and refrain from supplying false 
or misleading certifications.192 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. § 933(a), 124 Stat. 1872 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7). 
 186. See id. § 929Z (instructing the GAO to “conduct a study on the impact of 
authorizing a private right of action against any person who aids or abets another person 
in violation of the securities laws”). 
 187. See Macey, supra note 12, at 18. 
 188. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 3. 
 189. See id. at 4. 
 190. See Macey, supra note 12, at 21. 
 191. See id. Professor Macey postulates that the existence of gatekeepers such as 
credit rating agencies and accounting firms can only be explained by reputation theory. 
See id. 
 192. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Significantly, the reputation of gatekeepers is essential to the 
functioning of the capital markets.193 Investors rely on the information 
provided by gatekeepers to reduce information asymmetries between 
investors and issuers, thereby increasing transparency and reducing the 
cost of capital.194 Likewise, issuers make use of gatekeepers as 
“reputational intermediaries” in order to efficiently bolster their 
reputations for trustworthiness at a cost lower than if they attempted to 
build their reputations on their own.195 The reputation of the 
intermediary assures the investor that a company will use the investor’s 
capital wisely and produce a good rate of return.196 Courts have 
recognized the role of gatekeepers in the capital markets as reputational 
intermediaries197 as well as the value of reputational capital.198 But in 
order for this model to work, investors need to trust that they are 
receiving objective and accurate information from gatekeepers.199 
Information from an untrustworthy gatekeeper is worth little or 
nothing.200 In an economy with a dispersed ownership structure (i.e. 
companies with many diffuse shareholders like those in the U.S.), the 
role of reputational intermediaries becomes even more important.201 
                                                                                                                 
 193. See Macey, supra note 12. 
 194. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 371. 
 195. See Macey, supra note 12, at 19 (defining “reputational intermediary” as “a 
firm whose business it is to ‘rent’ its own reputation to client companies that are not 
large or established enough to have their own, or that obtain added value from 
burnishing their reputations by associating with a reputational intermediary”). 
“Investment banks, credit rating agencies, accounting firms, law firms, and organized 
stock exchanges like the NYSE have all served as reputational intermediaries at one 
time or another.” Id. 
 196. See id. at 23. 
 197. See, e.g., Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 156 
(2d Cir. 2010) (“Where statements are publicly attributed to a well-known national law 
or accounting firm, buyers and sellers of securities (and the market generally) are more 
likely to credit the accuracy of those statements.”). 
 198. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (“An 
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its 
reputation for careful work.”). 
 199. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 371. 
 200. See Macey, supra note 12, at 19. 
 201. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 8. 
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B. DISINCENTIVES FOR DEVELOPING A GOOD REPUTATION 
Conventional wisdom suggests that rational gatekeepers should not 
be willing to risk losing their reputational capital on behalf of just one 
client.202 However, in theory, a rational gatekeeper will risk depleting at 
least some reputational capital so long as it seems that the gains from 
inaccurate or misleading statements exceed the costs.203 
1. Conflicts of Interest 
Gatekeepers can face conflicts of interest that can cause them to 
rationally engage in reputation-depleting activities.204 This is largely due 
to what is arguably the source of gatekeeper conflicts of interest: the 
manner in which gatekeepers are compensated.205 Although they are 
hired to assure shareholders, gatekeepers are compensated by and take 
instructions from corporate management.206 
One major conflict of interest that arose in the 1990s stemmed from 
accounting firms expanding their offerings by cross-marketing 
consulting services to their audit clients.207 This provided an additional 
incentive for these firms to acquiesce to their clients’ demands.208 If they 
did not, the corporate client could not only cease its auditing business 
with that firm but also its consulting business.209 Professor Coffee points 
to the sharp rise in financial statement restatements in the late 1990s as 
strong evidence that auditors changed their behavior in the face of these 
new incentives that conflicted with the duties of a neutral auditor.210 He 
                                                                                                                 
 202. Id. at 8. 
 203. Partnoy, supra note 24, at 497-98. 
 204. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 317 (mentioning conflicts of interest as a reason 
that gatekeepers may risk or willingly sacrifice their reputational capital). 
 205. See id. at 371. 
 206. Id. at 3-4. 
 207. Id. at 322-23. 
 208. Id. at 323. Coffee acknowledges that empirical studies show no correlation 
between a high ratio of non-audit services to audit services and a higher probability of a 
financial statement restatement. However, he also makes the point that in a highly 
concentrated industry such as auditing, an auditor might still be deferential to her client 
as long as there was the potential of receiving consulting income sometime in the 
future. Auditors still had a motivation to acquiesce. 
 209. John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 
57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1411-12 (2002). 
 210. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 323. 
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also notes that in spite of the market’s clear aversion to financial 
restatements based on revenue recognition issues, they became the most 
common form of earnings restatement in the late 1990s.211 
Another possible source for conflicts of interest is the segmentation 
by gatekeeping firms of their clients into “regular” client groups and 
“special” (i.e., more profitable) client groups.212 Even though clients in 
both groups generally have similar contractual relationships with a given 
gatekeeping firm, the gatekeeper will invest more heavily in building 
relationships with the special, more profitable clients.213 While there is 
nothing illegal or unethical about this practice, if gatekeeping firms do 
not have proper internal controls in place, then this client segmentation 
can result in favoring clients in the special group at the expense of 
clients in the regular group.214 For instance, Professor Jonathan Macey 
points to persuasive evidence from the 2008 Financial Crisis that the 
credit rating agencies were less effective at rating structured assets for 
lucrative clients than they were for the bond issues of their traditional 
corporate and municipal customers.215 It is suspected that since the credit 
rating agencies received substantially higher fees from the former group, 
they exercised a lower standard of care in evaluating the risks of their 
structured products.216 
2. The Last Period Problem 
Evidence also suggests that if a gatekeeper’s large favored client is 
facing a “last period” scenario, the gatekeeping firm is more likely to 
participate in the client’s fraudulent scheme to artificially avoid or delay 
bankruptcy.217 Derived from game theory, the “last period problem” 
                                                                                                                 
 211. Id. at 60. 
 212. Macey, supra note 12, at 19. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. Macey cites an article by Martin Fridson which stated that “89% of the 
investment grade mortgage-backed securities ratings that Moody awarded in 2007 were 
subsequently reduced to speculative grade.” See Martin Fridson, Bond Rating Agencies: 
Conflicts and Competence,” 22 J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 56, 56 (Summer 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684896. 
 217. Enron accounted for 27% of audit fees collected by Arthur Andersen’s Houston 
office. Andersen earned $27 million in consulting fees and $25 million in audit fees 
from Enron. Professor Coffee cites these figures as evidence of the loss of Andersen’s 
professional independence with Enron, leading the accounting firm’s Houston office to 
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postulates that when a player knows that he is in the final period of a 
given timeframe, then any cooperative undertaking in which the player 
had engaged during the previous time periods deteriorates.218 The 
system of rewards and punishments that governed his behavior during 
the previous time periods no longer applies, and the player considers 
himself free to pursue more selfish objectives.219 For instance, in the 
classic prisoners’ dilemma game, in which two prisoners in separate 
interrogation rooms must decide whether or not to inculpate the other, a 
cooperative strategy is appealing at first.220 However, if the prisoners are 
told that they only have one more chance to make a move, then the 
rational choice becomes to abandon the cooperative strategy and 
inculpate the other prisoner.221 
In the business world, when an ordinarily risk-averse rational 
officer realizes that her firm is under potentially catastrophic stress due 
to business declines, she will suddenly become risk-prone and take 
aggressive and clandestine measures in order to avoid bankruptcy.222 
Committing fraud to shore up her firm’s stock price, preventing 
creditors from calling in debts, or simply buying more time becomes 
more appealing.223 Enron and Refco seem to fit this pattern, as 
managers, accountants, and lawyers at both companies were attempting 
to conceal massive liabilities that would have most likely triggered 
bankruptcy.224 
Theoretically, the dynamics of the end period problem apply to 
gatekeepers just as they do to issuers.225 If a gatekeeper finds itself in a 
                                                                                                                 
ignore or overrule internal recommendations designed to prevent the ‘capture’ of a local 
office or audit partner by a powerful client. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 28. 
 218. Sean J. Griffith, Afterward and Comment: Towards an Ethical Duty to Market 
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 220. Id. 
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 222. William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1328 (2002). 
 223. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 702-03 (1992). 
 224. See In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(hundreds of million in “uncollected receivables”); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative 
& ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
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last-period scenario, its reputational capital becomes virtually 
worthless.226 
3. Competition 
Competition among gatekeepers can also significantly affect the 
quality of gatekeeper performance.227 Too much competition can 
pressure gatekeepers to acquiesce more to their clients’ preferences out 
of fear of being replaced, while too little competition can cause 
gatekeepers to underperform.228 In the world of gatekeepers, the legal 
and securities research industries are characterized by active 
competition, while the accounting and credit rating industries are not.229 
In a noncompetitive market, gatekeepers have reduced incentives to 
enhance existing controls, invest in new technology, or make overall 
improvements to their practices.230 Credit-ratings agencies (of which 
there are only two major ones231), for example, are slow to provide 
updated monitoring of financial instruments after their initial rating.232 
Alternatively, in a highly competitive market, a gatekeeper may feel 
compelled to acquiesce to her corporate client’s demands out of a fear of 
being easily replaced.233 However, a gatekeeper’s willingness to resist 
client demands in a competitive industry, or the temptation of 
complacency in a noncompetitive industry, depends on whether the 
gatekeeper faces either the loss of its reputational capital or litigation 
from investors.234 
Competition can also induce desired behavior from gatekeepers but 
only to the extent that gatekeepers want to compete on the basis of 
reputation.235 However, up until the Enron debacle, it became clear that 
auditing firms at least were not competing on the basis of integrity or 
                                                                                                                 
2002), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1023409436545200 (detailing accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen’s collapse from participating in Enron’s Fraud). 
 226. See Partnoy, supra note 24, at 501. 
 227. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 104. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 318. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Moody’s and S&P. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 35. 
 232. COFFEE, supra note 2, at 324-25. 
 233. Id. at 104. 
 234. Id. at 318. 
 235. Id. at 321. 
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reporting accuracy but rather on flexibility and cooperation with 
clients.236 Issuers demanded that their accounting firms assist them with 
maximizing the firm’s stock price by using any accounting methods that 
were not prohibited.237 Such incidents show that in a competitive 
market, a gatekeeper’s maintenance of its reputational capital may lose 
out to other interests.238 
C. THE MARKET FOR REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL 
Professor Jonathan Macey theorizes that for market participants, 
laws and regulations are substitutes for reputational capital.239 As the 
amount of seemingly effective regulation for issuers and gatekeepers 
increases, the demand for reputational capital decreases.240 
Consequently, gatekeepers in markets that are perceived to be 
effectively regulated, such as the United States, will be less willing to 
invest in their reputations.241 As proof of this theory, Professor Macey 
cites surveys showing that corporations in emerging economies (where 
regulations are less developed) rank very high in terms of their 
reputations, and that corporate trust is higher in emerging economies 
and lower in developed economies (where regulation is more robust and 
effective).242 He argues that demand for reputation in the United States 
has collapsed since investors have become so heavily reliant on 
regulation, rather than the reputations of issuers or their gatekeepers, 
when making investment decisions.243 According to Professor Coffee, 
firms left with “excess” reputational capital cannot profit from it.244 
                                                                                                                 
 236. Id. at 327. 
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 238. See id. 
 239. See Demise of the Reputational Model, supra note 13, at 429. 
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 241. Id. at 445. 
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D. PRIVATE LITIGATION AS A DETERRENT TO REPUTATION-DEPLETING 
ACTIVITIES 
Just as reputation theory explains why gatekeepers would choose to 
deplete their reputational capital, deterrence theory focuses on the 
expected liability of gatekeepers who do so.245 Prior to Central Bank and 
the PSLRA, auditors faced a very real risk of liability enforced by class 
action litigation.246 The plaintiff’s bar was entrepreneurially motived by 
contingency fees and stood ready to act as private attorneys general for 
victims of securities fraud.247 However, once private plaintiffs could no 
longer bring aiding and abetting lawsuits against gatekeepers, the risk of 
liability became substantially less.248 Enforcement of such liability now 
fell to one overburdened agency, the SEC, who in the late 1990s was 
scaling back enforcement against the major accounting firms and who 
was also facing budgetary shortfalls.249 
1. The Expected Value of Fraud 
In describing how Sarbanes-Oxley failed to reinstate a private right 
of action for aiding and abetting liability,250 Professor Coffee concludes 
that: 
while the potential benefits from acquiescing in accounting 
irregularities appear to have been reduced for auditors, the expected 
costs to them from such acquiescence also remain low because the 
level of deterrence that they once faced has not been restored.251 
Implicitly, Professor Coffee is invoking the finance principle of 
“expected value” or “expected return.”252 Expected value is calculated 
by multiplying each possible outcome of a given scenario with the 
                                                                                                                 
 245. Id. at 60. 
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 247. Id. at 78. 
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likelihood that the given outcome will occur and then summing the 
totals.253 
Inferentially, in the world of gatekeeping liability, the expected 
value of acquiescing to an issuer’s accounting fraud is a scenario with 
two possible outcomes: (1) the gatekeeper has a successful civil action 
filed against it, or (2) the gatekeeper does not have a successful civil 
action filed against it.254 The following hypotheticals will illustrate two 
possible expected values for these outcomes.255 
Hypothetical #1 
An accounting firm is contemplating whether to acquiesce to its 
biggest client’s demand to help it commit fraud.256 If the firm acquiesces 
and is not caught, then the client will contribute a fifteen percent 
increase in the firm’s net worth over the next year.257 However, if the 
firm is caught and a successful civil action is filed against the company, 
the firm will face a huge loss of seventy percent of its net worth, with 
fifty percent of that loss constituting payments of damages, fines, and 
penalties, and the other twenty percent consisting of lost business due to 
the firm’s tarnished reputation.258 With a private right of action for 
aiding and abetting liability in place, the risk of litigation (i.e. the 
probability of being caught) is thirty-five percent, which means the 
chance that no litigation will occur is sixty-five percent.259 Therefore, 
the expected value of acquiescing to the client’s demand is (0.35 x -0.7) 
+ (0.65 x 0.15) = -0.15. (See Table 1 below).260 With a negative 
                                                                                                                 
 253. Id. For example, in a scenario with only two possible outcomes, Expected 
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expected value of acquiescing, the accounting firm would rationally 
choose not to do so.261 
Table 1 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION     
State of 
Enforcement 
Probability of 
Litigation 
Rate of 
Return if 
State Occurs 
  Product 
Caught 0.35 -0.7  -0.25 
Not Caught 0.65 0.15  0.10 
  1.0  EV = -0.15 
 
Hypothetical #2 
This hypothetical has the same conditions as Hypothetical #1 
except there is no private right of action for aiding and abetting 
liability.262 This has the effect of reducing the risk of litigation (i.e. the 
risk of being caught) to ten percent, which means that the chance of no 
litigation occurring is ninety percent.263 Therefore, the expected value of 
acquiescing to the client’s demand here is (0.10 x -0.7) + (0.90 x 0.15) = 
0.07 (see Table 2 below).264 With a positive expected value of seven 
percent, the accounting firm would rationally choose to acquiesce to its 
client’s demand to help it commit fraud.265 
  
                                                                                                                 
 261. See id. 
 262. See generally Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 27 (explaining that accountants 
face a lower level of deterrence due to the decreased threat of litigation). 
 263. Id. 
 264. ROSS, supra note 252. 
 265. See id. 
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Table 2 
NO PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION     
State of 
Enforcement 
Probability of 
Litigation 
Rate of Return 
if State Occurs   
Product 
Caught 0.10 -0.7  -0.07 
Not Caught 0.90 0.15  0.14 
  1.0  EV = 0.07 
 
These scenarios suggest that under the right circumstances, even 
with the possibility of massive losses resulting from being caught, 
gatekeepers can be rationally motivated to aid and abet their client’s 
fraudulent endeavors if the risk of being caught is low enough.266 
III. CONGRESS SHOULD RESTORE THE PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR 
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY 
If courts and law enforcement officials truly expect gatekeepers to 
serve as reputational intermediaries,267 then the need to reinstate private 
aiding and abetting liability gains additional urgency.268 The current 
legal framework does not provide the market with a strong enough 
incentive to demand that gatekeepers invest in their reputations.269 In 
fact, assuming that Professor Macey’s theories are correct, it is quite the 
opposite.270 The increase in regulation on gatekeepers from recent 
reforms such as Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley is having the effect of 
further driving down the value of gatekeepers’ reputational capital.271 
Perversely, this can provide an even larger incentive for gatekeepers to 
aid and abet a client’s fraud, especially if that client is, for instance, a 
large favored client facing a “last period” scenario.272 The problem is 
also compounded for gatekeepers either in highly competitive 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See generally Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 27 (suggesting that deterrence 
and the threat of litigation are positively correlated); ROSS, supra note 252. 
 267. See supra note 11. 
 268. See Klock, supra note 18, at 492-93. 
 269. See supra Part II.C. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
 272. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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industries273 or who have conflicts of interest that encourage reputation-
depleting activities.274 Under a decreased threat of litigation, the 
expected costs of participating in fraud decrease, making its expected 
value more positive.275 To prevent such temptations and increase the 
incentive for gatekeepers to act as reputational intermediaries, Congress 
must restore the private remedy.276 It would be perfectly reasonable for 
Congress to cap damages under such a regime.277 After all, the goal 
ultimately is deterrence for gatekeepers, not insolvency.278 But 
regardless of damages, by providing investors the ability to hold 
gatekeepers accountable for the market information they generate, one 
improves the functioning of the securities markets by creating more trust 
in an industry where trust is essential.279 
It was surely no coincidence that a period of major accounting 
scandals followed shortly after Central Bank and the PSLRA 
significantly reduced the threat of litigation for gatekeepers.280 Basic 
principles of finance and economics show that when the probability of a 
negative outcome to an action decreases, its costs relative to its benefits 
also decrease.281 While Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in part to mitigate 
this more “permissive” environment for gatekeepers,282 the Refco 
debacle and the Financial Crisis provide strong evidence that its reforms 
were not enough.283 A plaintiffs’ bar acting as private attorneys general 
and supplementing the efforts of the SEC and the PCAOB may have 
averted or at least somewhat alleviated these crises.284 As it stands now 
                                                                                                                 
 273. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 274. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 275. See supra Part II.D. 
 276. See generally Hearing on S. 1551, supra note 64, 103-13 (laying out the 
argument that restoring the private right of action will decrease gatekeepers’ incentives 
to acquiesce to fraud). 
 277. Id. at 111. 
 278. Id. at 112. 
 279. Macey, supra note 12, at 18. 
 280. See supra Part II.B.2.d. 
 281. See supra Part II.D. 
 282. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 16. 
 283. See generally In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (fraud occurred after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted), aff’d sub nom. Pac. Inv. 
Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Macey, 
supra note 12, at 19 (credit ratings agencies gave overly favorable ratings to the 
securities of high fee-paying clients in the period after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted). 
 284. See COFFEE, supra note 2, at 78. 
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though, these two government agencies are the only entities with the 
power to civilly enforce the relevant securities laws.285 Therefore, the 
likelihood and frequency of litigation that holds gatekeepers accountable 
for aiding and abetting fraud is substantially decreased.286 
As Judge Lynch’s comments in In re Refco seem to suggest, it is 
incongruous that while most criminal defendants convicted under 
accomplice liability theories can also be held civilly liable by their 
victims, the victims of criminal securities frauds cannot similarly sue the 
gatekeeper “accomplices” who helped perpetrate them.287 Since the 
defendant corporation is most likely insolvent in such cases, aiding and 
abetting liability could potentially provide private plaintiffs with their 
sole means of restitution.288 But victims of securities frauds with 
judgment proof bankrupt defendants are currently stymied by the lack of 
a private aiding and abetting remedy.289 Unless they can successfully 
develop theories of liability under sections 11 or 12 of the ‘33 Act or of 
primary liability under section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act, then the courthouse 
door is effectively shut for them.290 The holdings of Stoneridge and 
especially Janus ensure that holding a gatekeeper liable for a primary 
violation will be very difficult.291 
CONCLUSION 
Gatekeepers in the United States currently have little incentive to 
build or preserve the reputational capital necessary to effectively serve 
in their expected roles of reputational intermediaries. In a highly 
regulated securities market like the United States, regulation must be 
combined with the credible deterrent threat of litigation in order to 
provide that incentive. History and mathematics show that when the risk 
of litigation decreases, the incidence of fraud and accounting 
irregularities increases. The private remedies under the ‘33 Act are too 
limited in scope to provide effective deterrence for gatekeepers who are 
                                                                                                                 
 285. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7214-7215; HAZEN, supra note 30, § 1.4[6]. 
 286. See supra Part II.D. 
 287. Cf. In re Refco, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 319 n.15 (“It is perhaps dismaying that 
participants in a fraudulent scheme who may even have committed criminal acts are not 
answerable in damages to the victims of [their] fraud . . . .”). 
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tempted to acquiesce to their clients’ fraudulent schemes. Also, the SEC 
and PCAOB are vulnerable to agency capture, budget cuts, and other 
limitations. The scope, scale, and the profusion of securities and 
accounting frauds are too much for only one or two agencies to handle, 
regardless of how competent and diligent they are. Plaintiffs as private 
attorneys general can provide much needed reinforcements. Therefore, 
Congress should restore the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for 
aiding and abetting liability. 
